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Abstract
This study used panel OLS, fixed and random effects models to check the effect of trade 
openness and public sector corruption on the environment. Government effectiveness has 
been used as a measure of public sector corruption. CO2 and methane gas emissions are used 
as the measure of environmental degradation.  Different specification tests, such as F-test and 
Hausman specification test are used to make selection among ordinary least square, fixed 
effect and random effect model. Random effect model seems best to handle such a situation. 
In this study the random effect framework is the preferred model, but this study also presents 
the results from the fixed effects model for comparison purpose. The results of the random 
effect model are the main finding of this study which concluded that there is negative and 
significant effect of trade openness, government effectiveness on both CO2 and methane gas 
emissions. In this way the world trade openness has also brought to the fore the importance of 
regulation of government policies towards openness because results has already warned that 
government effectiveness is volatile and is expected to become more tense thus the strategy 
needs to identify aspects of government corruption which are hurting economies.
Keywords: Environmental Pollution, Fixed and Random Effects Model, Openness to Trade, 
Public Sector Corruption, Pooled OLS.
I. Introduction
During recent years, economists, social 
scientists and policy analysts have focused on 
checking the relationship among trade open-
ness, government effectiveness and the envi-
ronment. For over a decade researchers have 
found the possible rise in openness to trade 
which negatively impact on the environmen-
tal protection. Most of the previous empirical 
work has focused on the relationship among 
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trade openness, public sector corruption and 
the environment which make the main factors 
of policy discussions. As abatement cost rises 
with the severity of environmental policy reg-
ulation has most certainly been a larger factor 
for making changes in trade liberalization pol-
icy and public sector corruption. For instance 
the analysis about public sector corruption, 
trade openness and environmental degrada-
tion showed that the increased pollution is 
due to globalization which can be controlled 
by domestic political institutions1. Big indus-
trial countries do not cut their spending in 
response to decreasing trade openness. An-
donova, Mansfield & Milner (2007), Kaufman 
& Segura-Ubiergo (2001), Rudra (2002) and 
Wibbels (2006) have suggested that trade 
openness is associated with weaker environ-
mental policy even if the government is effec-
tive. Hillman and Ur Sprung (1994) estimat-
ed the relationships between environmental 
protection and trade policies with the help 
of political corruption. They examined that 
trade openness policy depends on the nature 
of the externality, and the environmental con-
dition do not depend upon the global trade. 
The aim of this study is to examine fixed and 
random effects models to check the effect of 
trade openness and public sector corruption 
on the environment.
The structure of this paper is organized 
as follows. Section 2 consists of review of 
the existing literature. Section 3 outlines the 
structure of the model and discusses about 
theoretical framework. Section 4 presents 
data sources. Section 5 demonstrates the 
econometric methodology. Section 6 reveals 
the empirical results, and Section 7 concludes 
and presents some policy recommendations.
2.  Review of Theoretical and Empiri-
cal literature
This section briefly summarizes few im-
portant working papers and articles in the 
literature looking at the relationship among 
trade openness, government effectiveness 
and environment for giving clear concept 
about relationship among trade openness, 
government effectiveness and environment 
through literature on the subject. The rela-
tionship among trade openness, government 
effectiveness and environment is a highly de-
bated topic in the environmental growth and 
development literature. 
Yet, this issue is far from being resolved. 
Theoretical studies found very complex and 
ambiguous relationship among trade open-
ness government effectiveness and environ-
ment.  The phenomenal differences among 
environment condition in the South and East 
Asian, the Latin American, and Sub-Saharan 
African countries in several decades have en-
couraged a renewed interest in the effects 
of trade openness and government effec-
tiveness on environmental degradation. The 
debate on different countries has often been 
fruitless because they differ in their belief on 
government actions against environmental 
degradation. The purpose of this study is set 
out what we currently know about the envi-
ronmental pollution and international trade 
with the help of government corruption 
through theoretical and empirical literature 
of different studies conducted by authors 
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from different countries.
 
The model of this paper is developed in 
Section 3 with the help of Damania, Fredriks-
son, and List (2002) model2. Much of the ear-
lier literature focuses on issues like on envi-
ronmental and international trade issues. 
Although this paper also focuses on how 
trade openness and public sector corruption 
affects environmental degradation. So this 
study focuses on these issues as crucial to 
resolving current policy questions, with the 
help of few literatures which check relation-
ship among trade openness, public sector 
corruption and environmental degradation in 
their own countries. 
Leidy and Hoekman (1994) discovered the 
relationship between environmental tools 
and trade policy, they founds that polluting 
industries favors inadequate environmental 
policy because it boosts the level of trade 
barriers. 
Copeland (1994) investigated the benefi-
cial effects of trade on environmental policy 
reforms.  He also includes the case of global 
factor mobility. Further, the argument to as-
sess globalization and environment is in line 
with Copeland and Taylor (1995) who ana-
lyzes the intentional interaction between de-
veloped and poor countries that moves from 
autarky to free trade, permitting trade-in-
come related environmental policies. 
Strutt and Anderson (2000), reported a 
case study of Indonesia till 2020, through 
global economic growth and structural chang-
es they used an extended dataset for the pe-
riods 1992–2010 and 2010–2020. They con-
cluded that trade policy reforms for the next 
two decades would improve and reduce the 
depletion of natural resources.
Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001) 
researched using data for 43 countries over 
the 1971-1996 period. Their estimates result 
showed that trade has positive impact on en-
vironmental growth. Therefore they conclude 
free trade is good for environment.
 
Lopez and Mitra (2000) providing an ex-
cellent literature review on the relationship 
among corruption, income and pollution [the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC)]. They 
found evidence that if Govt is implementing 
good governance, it tend to increase eco-
nomic growth then it would result in higher 
turning point in pollution.
Damania, Fredriksson, and List (2002) have 
analyzed Organization for Economic Co-op-
eration and Development (OECD) countries 
using panel random and fixed effect model 
for the 1982 to 1992 period to examine the 
causal relationship among corruption trade 
liberalization and environment. Their results 
interpreted that, countries with more open 
trade regimes tend to have stricter environ-
mental regulations on average. 
Fredriksson and Svensson (2002) investi-
gated the effect of public sector corruption 
and political instability on environmental pol-
icy by using cross-country data for 63 devel-
oped and developing countries. Their results 
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collaborated that there is strong correlation 
between corruption and political instability, 
and corruption is significantly negatively cor-
related with the environmental policies.
Managi (2004) using panel data for 63 de-
veloped and developing countries for the pe-
riod from 1960 to 1999 to check whether free 
trade is harmful or beneficial for the environ-
ment.  He concluded that trade openness is 
found to have harmful effects on environ-
ment.  
Frankel and Rose (2002, 2005) taking data 
set of cross-section countries in 1995 to check 
the impact of openness to trade on the envi-
ronment.  But their result confirms negative 
and insignificant relationship between trade 
openness and environment degradation in 
capital abundant countries.
Copeland and Taylor (2004) examined the 
environmental consequences of economic 
growth and international trade by using stat-
ic model of production-generated pollution. 
Their result shows that increasing integration 
of the global economy tends to increase in-
come and it has positive impact on domestic 
environmental policy regulation. 
Morse (2007) estimated the relationship 
between the corruption and Environmen-
tal Sustainability in cross-national countries. 
Their study employed the Environmental 
Sustainability Index (ESI) taken index for the 
period 2001, 2002, and 2005, and Corrup-
tion Perception Index (CPI) of 2002 created 
by Transparency International (TI).  Their re-
search results concluded that there is signif-
icant relationship among corruption, income 
and environmental degradation.
Antweiler et al., (2001) observed that the 
effect of trade openness on pollution emis-
sions depend on a country’s comparative ad-
vantage. Their study described that trade lib-
eralization always increases the pollution tax 
due to positive income effect. They suggested 
that the level of corruption determines the 
relative importance of bribery versus social 
welfare. 
The model by Grossman and Help-
man (1994)  closely characterizes a form 
of high-level corruption. Coate and Morris 
(1996) also pointed out that a reduction in 
corruption unambiguously leads to an in-
crease in the pollution tax. Khagram (2004) 
taking cross-country studies, evidenced that 
high public sector corruption have also been 
related with inequality and low environmen-
tal taxes, but there is another debate that 
poor countries tolerate corruption more than 
rich countries.
3. Theoretical Framework and Model 
Specification
Despite the discussion about the link 
among trade openness, government effec-
tiveness and environmental degradation, the 
existing literature in economics has failed to 
examine the consequences of trade liberal-
ization policy on environmental change. This 
study develops a model with the help of Da-
mania, Fredriksson, and List (2002) model in 
which the trade openness, government effec-
tiveness, some relevant socio-economic vari-
ables and interaction terms reveals that how 
it affect environment thorough random and 
fixed effect model. The random effect model 
is the best model of the study and random ef-
fect model results showed that there is nega-
tive and significant effect of trade openness, 
government effectiveness on both CO
2
 and 
methane gas emissions in this study.  
The model of the present study can be de-
scribed as follows:
Y=F(TO,GE,RGDP,UP,LF,I,YS,K,M,N, E)………...1
Where
Y: Carbon dioxide and Methane gas emissions
TO: Ratio of exports plus imports divide by GDP
GE: Government Effectiveness is measure of pub-
lic sector corruption. Its value lies between +2.5 
to -2.5. +2.5 means government is highly efficient, 
-2.5 means Government is highly corrupted.
RGDP: Real GDP per capita
UP: Urbanization or Urban population (% of total 
population exposed to industrial pollution/dam-
ages)
LF:  Labor force participation rate (% of total pop-
ulation)
I:  Investment (% of total investment in industries) 
YS: Years of schooling which indicates education 
increases income which raises luxurious commod-
ities demand and hence pollution.
K: RGDP2 represents Environmental Kuznets Curve 
(EKC) hypothesis which described that if income 
rises, in first stage environmental damages in-
creases but after reaching maximum point in-
come tends to reduces environmental damages 
as people pay taxes for regulation that’s why En-
vironmental Kuznets curve is inverted ‘U’ shape 
Whereas interaction terms are defined as:
M: (TO*RGDP) characterizes as output generated 
by trade openness 
N: (GE*RGDP) stands for implementation of envi-
ronmental regulation 
E: (GE*TO) symbolizes as trade openness generat-
ed by government efficiency. 
4.  Data sources
The  time series data on the CO
2
 and meth-
ane gas emission in kilo ton (kt), trade open-
ness (as %), real GDP per capita in constant 
2000 US $, investment  (as % of total invest-
ment in industries), urbanization or urban 
population (as % of total population exposed 
to industrial pollution/damages), labor force 
participation (as % of total population) and en-
rollment in secondary school collected from 
the World Development Indicators (WDI: an 
expanded set of international comparisons, 
Version-2012). The government effectiveness 
index is taken from World Governance Indica-
tors. The panel consists of 12 Asian develop-
ing countries spanning the years from 1995 
to 2012.
5.  Econometric Methodology
There are basically three types of panel 
models namely Pooled Ordinary least square 
regression, a panel model with fixed effect and 
panel model with random effect. This study 
used pooled ordinary least square (OLS), fixed 
effect model (FEM) and random effect mod-
el (REM) for estimation of the effect of trade 
openness, government effectiveness and all 
other explanatory variables  on carbon diox-
ide emission and methane gas emissions. But 
the best model is random effect model in this 
study. The models are specified as follows:
Yit=όitΩit+μit …………………………….....…………. (2)
Where Y is the dependent variable (CO
2 
and methane gas emission), ό represents a 
vector of explanatory variables, Ω is slope 
coefficients, i denotes for the countries t de-
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notes time and μit is the error term which is 
assumed to be white noised and varies over 
both country and time. While using a pooled 
OLS regression, countries’ unobservable indi-
vidual effects are therefore not controlled. Ac-
cording to Bevan and Danbolt (2004), hetero-
geneity of the countries under consideration 
for analysis can influence measurements of 
the estimated parameters. The fixed-effects 
model can be derived from equation (2) rela-
tive to the notations used in the study as fol-
lows:
Yit = αi + λi + β1TOit+ β2GEit + β 3RGDPit + β 4UPit  + β 
5
LFit  + β 6Iit  + β 7YSit  + β 8Kit  +β9Mit+β10Nit+β11Eit+ 
μit………………………………………………...... (3)
In equation (3), Y is the dependent vari-
able (CO
2
 and methane gas) αi captures unob-
served country-specific effects assumed fixed 
over time, i –1 dummy variables are used to 
designate the particular country, this model 
is sometimes called the least square dum-
my variables model (LSDV). The dummy for 
Pakistan is used as comparison country. The 
year-effects represented by λi are included 
to account for shocks that are common to all 
countries in the sample, year 2012 dummy 
taken as comparison year in this study. From 
equation (2) study derives the random-effects 
model as follows:
Yit =  λi + β1TOit γi + β2GEit γi + β 3RGDPit γi 
+ β 
4
UPit  γi + β 5LFit γi + β 6Iit  γi + β 7YSitγi+
β
8
Kitγi+β9Mitγi+β10Nγiti+β11Eitγi+μit,γi=(γ ) γ +σi 
………...….…………..........(4)
The explanatory variables remain as de-
fined in equation (1). In equation (4) μ is the 
error term, σi represents for random country 
effect while (γ ) γ  is the mean of the coef-
ficient vector. The slope coefficients are al-
lowed to vary randomly across countries, un-
der the random-effects model.  Hsiao (1996) 
argues that the OLS procedure yields biased 
and inconsistent estimates, especially when 
the omitted country-specific variables are 
correlated with the explanatory variables. 
This model is a generalized, group-wise het-
eroscedastic model. For the selection of best 
model among these models, F test and Haus-
man specification are conducted in this study.
6.  Empirical Analysis
This section begins with the empirical anal-
ysis by examining the results from the Haus-
man test with regard to the selection of the 
most appropriate model between the fixed 
(FEM) and random effects (REM) frameworks. 
The Hausman test statistics presented in Ta-
ble 1 and 3 indicate that the random effect 
model should be preferred over the fixed ef-
fect model. In each model (1-8), the test sta-
tistic suggests that the null hypothesis is the 
FEM and REM estimators differ substantially 
should not be rejected at the 1 percent level. 
Although the random effect framework is the 
preferred model, but this study also presents 
the results from the fixed effects model for 
comparison purposes.  
Tables 1-4 display the results of CO
2
 and 
methane gas emissions from the pooled OLS, 
fixed effects and random effect model. The 
first column of Table 1 and 3 list the explan-
atory variables followed by several statistics. 
The diagnostic statistics include the R2, Haus-
man test and F test statistics. The number of 
countries in the panel, and the total number 
of observations both across country and over 
time also written in the first column. The 
columns in Tables 1-4 present the results of 
separate regression models. For easy identi-
fication, the regression equations are named 
in columns. Column 2 to 5 of Table 1 & 3 and 
column second, forth & sixth of Table 2 & 4, 
the study present the results of pooled OLS, 
country fixed effect, period fixed effect and 
random effect models for CO
2
 and methane 
gas emissions respectively.
In Table 1, model 1 results indicate that 
coefficient of trade openness and imple-
mentation of environmental regulation has 
negative and statistically significant impact 
on CO
2
 emissions. This result implies that in-
crease in trade openness and improvement 
in environmental regulation would reduce 
CO
2
 emissions. Coefficient of government ef-
fectiveness, urbanization, investment & trade 
openness generated by government efficien-
cy have positive and significant effect on CO
2 
emissions. This result provide evidence that 
if government policies are ineffective i.e. cor-
ruption level is  high, urbanization creates 
employment in industries and people invest 
in industries then consequently level of CO
2
 
emissions would be high. 
Model 2 reports that the coefficients of 
government effectiveness, real GDP per cap-
ita, urban population, years of schooling and 
dummies for countries in column 2 of table 
2: China, India and Indonesia have positive 
and statistically significant and dummies of 
countries Bangladesh, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, 
Philippines, Singapore & Honk Kong have 
negative and statistically significant effect 
on CO
2
 emissions. This result indicates that 
if government policies are ineffective, con-
sequently CO
2
 emission would increase. The 
rapid urbanization creates congestion and 
employment in industries in urban areas 
which increase pollution. The increased lev-
el of education increases income, also real 
GDP per capita raises demands for luxurious 
goods, such as automobiles, air conditioners 
and other electrical appliances (pollution in-
tensive goods) therefore CO
2
 gas emissions 
would be increased.
The results of model 3 indicate that coef-
ficient of government effectiveness, real GDP 
per capita, years of schooling, implemen-
tation of environmental regulation and all 
period dummies (column 4 of Table 2) have 
statistically significant and positive while 
trade openness, labor force participation, 
environmental Kuznets curve, output gener-
ated by trade openness and trade openness 
generated by government efficiency have 
negative and statistically significant effect 
on CO
2
 emissions. It means trade openness, 
labor force participation, and environmen-
tal Kuznets curve (higher per capita income) 
beneficial for environment tends to reduce 
CO
2
 emissions. If government does not effi-
ciently implement environmental regulation 
policies due to corruption, income and high-
er education level also tends to increase CO
2
 
emissions.  
The results of random effect model for 
CO
2
 are reported in column 5 of table 1. The 
results of model 4 interprets that the coef-
ficients of trade openness, government ef-
fectiveness, urbanization, investment, years 
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of schooling, output generated by trade 
openness, implementation of environmen-
tal regulation and trade openness generated 
by government efficiency  have positive and 
significant effect on CO
2
 emissions. Although 
trade openness, output generated by trade 
openness and implementation of environ-
mental regulation have negative impact on 
CO
2
 gas emissions. This result suggests that 
trade openness, government effectiveness 
for implementation of environmental reg-
ulation and output produced by trade are 
beneficial for environment. Conversely ur-
banization, investment and years of school-
ing tend to increase CO
2
 emissions. Years of 
schooling increases income and demand for 
goods which increase industrial production, 
investment in industries increases pollu-
tion through production and hiring of work 
force, urbanization increases employment in 
industries which raises pollution. These re-
sults support the strength of the results from 
the random effects model (i.e. the preferred 
model). Although according to these results, 
these models (1-4) results  favors Faiz-ur-Reh-
man, Ali and Nasir (2007)  results who also 
concluded that trade openness have positive 
and significant effect on environment regula-
tion but also reduces government corruption. 
 
To measure the random deviation (er-
ror component) of individual intercept from 
mean value of all cross-sectional intercept 
which is (γ ) γ is reported in Table 2, column 
6. The mean value of the random error com-
ponent  (γ ) γ is the common intercept val-
ue of 2.45. The cross-section’s random value 
for Pakistan is 2.72E-08 tells how much the 
random error component of Pakistan differs 
from the common intercept value. Similarly 
Cross-section random value of Bangladesh = 
-7.23E-07, China = 2.58E-07, India = 4.57E-08, 
Indonesia = 2.84E-08, Iran = 2.55E-07, Malay-
sia = -1.29E-07, Sri Lanka = -1.05E-07, Philip-
pines = -1.15E-07, Thailand = 6.47E-07, Singa-
pore = 6.47E-08 and Hong Kong = -2.55E-07 
differs from the common intercept value as 
given in the table 2.
For model 5 the study reports the results 
from pooled regression for methane gas emis-
sions. The regression coefficients of trade 
openness, real GDP per capita and imple-
mentation of environmental regulation have 
negative and statistically significant effect but 
government effectiveness, urbanization, la-
bor force participation, investment and years 
of schooling have positive and statistically 
significant effect on methane gas emissions. 
So if trade is more open, increased income 
generates awareness and effective environ-
mental regulation reduces pollution. 
In model 6 and 7, study analyzed fixed 
effect model for methane gas emissions. In 
this way the results of model 6 reported that 
the coefficient of government effectiveness, 
trade openness, labor force participation, 
investment, environmental Kuznets curve, 
output generated by trade openness, imple-
mentation of environmental regulation and 
trade openness generated by government 
4See Faiz-ur-rehman, Ali and Nasir (2007) article ‘Corruption, trade openness, and environmental quality: a panel data analysis of selected 
South Asian countries’ for understanding of full issue.
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efficiency have statistically insignificant effect 
on methane gas emissions. The coefficients 
of real GDP per capita, urbanization, years of 
schooling and countries dummies (column 
2 of table 4) for Bangladesh, China, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand have positive and significant effect 
on methane gas emissions whereas Sri Lan-
ka, Singapore and Honk Kong have negative 
and statistically significant effect on methane 
gas emissions. It means GDP, urbanization 
and years of schooling create more income 
so people spend more on luxurious goods, 
which increase methane gas emission. 
Countries dummies for all time periods of 
model 7 (column 4 of table 4) shows signif-
icant effect on methane gas emissions but 
time dummies 1996, 1997, 2009 and 2010 
have negative signs. In model 7 coefficient 
of urbanization and years of schooling have 
statistically significant and positive while all 
remaining variables have insignificant effect 
on methane gas emissions. It concludes that 
if urbanization creates jobs in industries and 
no. of years of schooling or education make 
more demand of luxurious items i.e. cars so 
methane gas emission also increases.
Model 8 comprises results of random ef-
fect model in which the period effect is as-
sumed fixed. Furthermore random effect 
model results are more appropriate than 
fixed effect results. In this way results re-
ported that regression coefficient of trade 
openness, Govt. effectiveness, real GDP per 
capita, urban population, labor force partic-
ipation, investment, years of schooling, en-
vironment Kuznets curve, output generated 
by trade openness, implementation of en-
vironmental regulation and trade openness 
generated by Govt. efficiency have significant 
effect. Trade openness, real GDP per capita 
and implementation of environmental reg-
ulation have negative impact on methane 
gas emissions. This result implies that trade 
openness reduces methane gas emissions 
and Govt. policies are effective so people pay 
more tax out of their income so environment 
quality improves. Richard Damania , Per G. 
Fredriksson  and John A. List also support 
these results as their results concluded that 
trade openness policy and environment has 
negative relationship only if government pol-
icies are strong. Per G. Fredriksson and Jakob 
Svensson (2003)  also discussed the trade 
policies and government corruption issues 
for environment regulation in their study. 
They also supports this present study results 
and concluded that government corruption 
has positive relationship with environment 
degradation and when corruption is low en-
vironment condition will improve.
The mean value of the random error com-
ponent  (γ ) γ (column 6 of table 4) is the com-
mon intercept value of 1.65. The cross-sec-
tion’s random value for Pakistan is 2.50E-08 
tells how much the random error component 
of Pakistan differs from the common intercept 
value. Similarly Cross-section random value 
of Bangladesh=-4.85E-08, China = 3.16E-08, 
India = -1.24E-08, Indonesia = -3.15E-08, Iran 
= 1.47E-08, Malaysia = 2.11E-08, Sri Lanka = 
-1.63E-08, Philippines = 1.20-E-08, Thailand 
= 5.34E-08, Singapore = -2.18E-08 and Hong 
Kong = -1.53E-08 differs from the common in-
tercept value as given in the table 4.
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7.  Conclusions and Policy Implications
There has been a long debate among pol-
icy makers and economists at the national 
and international levels about whether trade 
openness and public sector corruption have 
any impact on environmental degradation. 
This study focuses on an empirical analysis 
in the framework for panel of 12 Asian coun-
tries by employing data from 1995 to 2012. 
This study employed fixed and random ef-
fects model for the analysis. This study also 
examined pooled OLS regression model to 
show that if country-specific features, such 
as law and order situations and tax struc-
tures are omitted then the pooled OLS pro-
cedure yields biased and inconsistent results 
especially when the omitted country and 
time specific variables are correlated with 
the explanatory variables which might affect 
environmental regulation. The paper tried 
to minimize the country and time specific 
heterogeneity by imposing dummies, such 
as, in case of fixed effect model the study 
used time and country specific dummies. Al-
though the random effect framework is the 
preferred model, but this study also presents 
the results from the fixed effects model for 
comparison purpose. 
The result of the random effect model 
concludes that there is negative and signifi-
cant effect of among trade openness, govern-
ment effectiveness on both CO
2
 and methane 
gas emissions.  The study also suggests that 
trade openness generated by government 
efficiency concluded that the public sector 
corruption influence trade openness by their 
beneficial trade policies. Government may 
import pollution abatement devices accord-
ing to green policies which will reduce gas 
emissions. Moreover, output generated by 
trade openness also have negative impact on 
both gas emissions which means trade open-
ness is good for environmental health. Finally, 
implementation of environmental regulation 
depends upon on the level of corruption. If 
government policies are effective then envi-
ronment regulations are conducive for peo-
ple. 
In light of above results, the main poli-
cy recommendations are that government 
should adopt green policies for pollution 
abatement. Government must strengthen its 
monitoring capability against pollution and 
regulate abatement technologies or devices 
in the light of their strategy. Side by side gov-
ernment should also provide proper guidance 
for pollution abatement by different research 
programs. For openness of trade, govern-
ment should create trade zones, corridors 
and boundaries which will enhance environ-
mental health and stability. The world trade 
openness policies should also brought the 
importance of regulation of government pol-
icies towards openness because government 
effectiveness is volatile mostly so strategies 
needs to be identify about government cor-
ruption that are hurting many countries econ-
omy. So with the help of trade openness pol-
icies through adopting pragmatic approach 
and by removing government corruption 
environment regulation should improves in a 
better way.
5See Per G. Fredriksson and Jakob Svensson (2003) for full issue
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Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Pooled OLS Countries Fixed Effect (CFE) Periods Fixed Effect (PFE) Random Effect (RE)
C 2.434*
(1.683794)
-0.306
(-0.136)
4.024***
(3.065)
2.434***
(4.276)
TO -0.593***
(-3.095)
-0.033
(-0.238)
-0.137
(-0.931)
-0.593***
(-7.8601)
GE 0.638***
(4.129)
0.264***
(2.702)
0.246***
(2.533)
0.6388***
(10.49)
RGDP -0.120
(-0.408)
0.7230***
(3.393)
0.506***
(2.246)
-0.1206***
(-1.023)
UP 0.882***
(6.6369)
0.4487*
(1.734)
0.235
(0.969)
0.889***
(16.854)
LF 0.1545
(0.513)
-0.368
(-0.730)
-1.1599***
(-2.239)
0.1543
(1.047)
I 0.931***
(26.744)
0.0230
(0.415)
0.094
(1.4305)
0.931***
(67.924)
YS 0.1759
(1.4294)
0.2977***
(2.228)
0.351***
(2.735)
0.1750***
(3.604)
K -0.067*
(-0.058)
-0.0107
(-0.223)
-0.0373
(-0.7995)
-0.0067
(-0.198)
M -0.121
(-1.040)
0.002
(0.047)
-0.005*
(-0.116)
-0.1212***
(-2.643)
N -4.9E-05***
(-5.677)
-5.35E-06
(-0.7823)
7.25E-07*
(0.108)
-4.29E-05***
(-14.425)
E 0.001*
(1.641)
-0.002
(-1.010)
-0.002**
(-1.935)
0.001***
(4.679)
R-Squared 0.9185 0.988 0.9402 0.9132
No of Countries 12 12 12 12
No. of Observations 216 216 216 216
F-test F= 101**(0.000)
Hausman Test H=11.047***(0.001)
Estimation: To choose FEM or REM the Hausman test can be used which has an asymptotic chi-square distribution which tests the hypothesis 
that FEM and REM estimators differ substantially against the null hypothesis FEM and REM estimators do not differ substantially.
The F-test has normal distribution N (0, 1) and tests the null hypothesis of insignificance as a whole of the estimated parameters, against the 
alternative hypothesis of significance as a whole of the estimated parameters.
 ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 % level of significance, respectively. The figure in parentheses represents the t-statistic. 
Source: Author’s calculation
Table 1: Pooled and Panel data Models: Dependent variable CO2
Countries Fixed Effect Periods Fixed Effect Random Effect
Pakistan
-0.306
(0.891)
1995
4.7591**
(0.031)
Pakistan 2.72E-08
Bangladesh
-0.938***
(0.001)
1996
4.6070**
(0.032)
Bangladesh -7.23E-07
China
2.775***
(0.000)
1997
4.6666**
(0.032)
China 2.58E-07
India
2.194***
(0.000)
1998
4.8880**
(0.025)
India 4.57E-08
Indonesia
0.3019***
(0.000)
1999
4.9033**
(0.031)
Indonesia 2.84E-08
Iran
-0.1650
(0.454)
2000
4.8702**
(0.033)
Iran 2.55E-07
Malaysia
-1.795***
(0.000)
2001
4.9551**
(0.032)
Malaysia -1.29E-07
Sri Lanka
-2.667***
(0.000)
2002
4.9468**
(0.033)
Sri Lanka -1.05E-07
Philippines
-1.030***
(0.000)
2003
4.8982**
(0.022)
Philippines -1.15E-07
Thailand
-0.4665
(0.572)
2004
4.858**
(0.023)
Thailand 6.47E-07
Singapore
-3.843***
(0.000)
2005
4.7680**
(0.0276)
Singapore 6.47E-08
Hong Kong
-4.4739***
(0.000)
2006
4.6488**
(0.026)
Hong Kong -2.55E-07
2007
4.5044**
(0.0345)
2008
4.4162**
(0.023)
2009
4.2780**
(0.029)
2010
4.0029**
(0.031)
2011
4.1339**
(0.028)
2012 4.090***
(0.002)
Table 2: Corresponding Intercept Value for CO2
***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 % level of significance, respectively. The figure in parentheses represents the p-values.
Source: Author’s calculation
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Independent Variables
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Pooled OLS Countries Fixed Effects (CFE)
Periods Fixed Effect 
(PFE) Random Effect (RE)
C
1.642
(1.548)
1.786
(1.039)
1.8603**
(1.7100)
1.645***
(3.7199)
TO
-0.334***
(-2.38)
-0.1404
(-1.306)
-0.1833
(-1.551)
-0.3325***
(-5.7973)
GE
0.3039***
(2.684)
0.0512
(0.6864)
0.0703
(0.9740)
0.3039***
(6.520)
RGDP
-1.163***
(-5.345)
0.2636*
(1.6150)
0.1107
(0.6457)
-1.163***
(-13.016)
UP
1.089***
(10.91)
0.7473***
(3.862)
0.6788***
(3.532)
1.080***
(26.783)
LF
1.131***
(5.123)
-0.1992
(-0.5060)
-0.5058
(-1.247)
1.1311***
(12.4748)
I
0.649***
(25.400)
-0.014
(-0.393)
-0.039
(-0.489)
0.6493***
(61.752)
YS
0.5451***
(6.036)
0.330***
(3.3032)
0.353***
(3.628)
0.5450***
(14.638)
K
0.0650
(0.7585)
-0.0376
(-0.8802)
-0.0582
(-1.323)
0.0650**
(1.8452)
M
-0.0340
(-0.3564)
-0.0175
(-0.488)
-0.0219
(-0.684)
-0.0341
(-0.8698)
N
-3.48E-05***
(-6.2618)
-4.22E-06
(-0.8056)
-2.43E-06
(-0.4066)
-3.48E-05***
(-15.251)
E
0.0448
(0.9045)
4.85E-05
(0.1048)
-0.0289
(-0.6145)
0.0004***
(2.2014)
R-Squared 0.9684 0.9943 0.9010 0.9664
No of Countries 12 12 12 12
No of Observations 216 216 216 216
F-test F= 91.6***(0.000)
Hausman Test H=9.678***(0.0023)
Table 3: Pooled and Panel data Models for Methane Gas Emissions 
To choose FEM or REM the Hausman test should be used which has an asymptotic chi-square distribution and tests the hypothesis that FEM 
and REM estimators differ substantially against the null hypothesis FEM and REM estimators do not differ substantially.
The F-test has normal distribution N (0, 1) and tests the null hypothesis of insignificance as a whole of the estimated parameters, against the 
alternative hypothesis of significance as a whole of the estimated parameters.
 ***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 % level of significance, respectively. The figure in parentheses represents the t-statistic.
Source: Author’s calculation
Countries Fixed Effect Periods Fixed Effect Random Effect
Pakistan
1.7861**
(0.0229)
1995
1.8683**
(0.064)
Pakistan 2.50E-08
Bangladesh
1.8428***
(0.0026)
1996
1.8042**
(0.049)
Bangladesh -4.85E-08
China
4.0087***
(0.000)
1997
1.7735**
(0.048)
China 3.16E-08
India
3.488***
(0.00)
1998
1.9876**
(0.046)
India -1.24E-08
Indonesia
2.088**
(0.013)
1999
1.9863**
(0.03)
Indonesia -3.15E-08
Iran
1.0356***
(0.000)
2000
2.0537**
(0.048)
Iran 1.47E-08
Malaysia
0.1778***
(0.000)
2001
1.9853**
(0.06)
Malaysia 2.11E-08
Sri Lanka
-0.0514***
(0.000)
2002
2.055**
(0.045)
Sri Lanka -1.63E-08
Philippines
1.0422***
(0.000)
2003
2.0336**
(0.033)
Philippines 1.20E-10
Thailand
1.4108*
(0.098)
2004
2.0463**
(0.0417)
Thailand 5.34E-08
Singapore
-3.4098***
(0.000)
2005
2.0848**
(0.0382)
Singapore -2.18E-08
Hong Kong
-3.2234***
(0.000)
2006
2.0663**
(0.037)
Hong Kong -1.53E-08
2007
1.954**
(0.040)
2008
1.923**
(0.040)
2009
1.8093**
(0.043)
2010
1.855**
(0.040)
2011
1.8898**
(0.036)
2012 1.8604*
(0.088)
Table 4: Corresponding Intercept Value for Methane gas 
***, **, and *denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 % level of significance, respectively. The figure in parentheses represents the p-values.
Source: Author’s calculation
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